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FREE SPEECH & TAINTED JUSTICE: RESTORING THE PUBLIC'S
CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY IN THE WAKE OF REPUBLICAN
PARTY OF MINNESOTA V WHITE
GREGORY W. JONES*
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White,' placing the First Amendment free speech rights of
candidates for judicial office at loggerheads with the due process guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court held that a Min-
nesota canon of judicial conduct violated the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution by prohibiting candidates for judicial office
from announcing their views on disputed legal or political topics, thus re-
stricting a protected form of speech. 2 The Court reasoned that limits on
speech during judicial campaigns deprived the electorate of vital informa-
tion that could potentially influence how votes are cast.3 Additionally, the
Court stated that the canon in question failed its intended purpose-to safe-
guard the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining actual and perceived
impartiality-by neglecting to provide similar speech-related limits for
sitting judges and undeclared candidates for judicial office.
4
While the Court's decision in White undoubtedly increases the elec-
torate's ability to learn more about judicial candidates by expanding the
scope of permitted campaign speech, 5 it also raises serious concerns re-
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2010; Notes
and Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review. The author is grateful for the feedback and guidance
provided by Professor Henry Perritt, Rob Grindle, and Margo Ely. A special debt of gratitude is owed
to Tim Jones, whose unflagging dedication to journalistic integrity inspired this effort. Thanks, dad.
1. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."); see also MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5A(3)(d)(i) (2000) (abrogated July 1,
2009); White, 536 U.S. at 768.
3. White, 536 U.S. at 768, 781 ("Debate on the qualifications of candidates is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms .. "); see, e.g., J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE:
DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 2 (2004), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/0b74af850b8l d92928_bvm6y5sdf.pdf.
4. White, 536 U.S. at 773-777; see, e.g., GASS, supra note 3, at 2; see also Ofer Raban, Judicial
Impartiality and the Regulation of Judicial Election Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 205, 217
(2004).
5. See CITIZENS COMM'N FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT
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garding the preservation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
Specifically, the Court's decision in White permits judicial candidates to
announce their views on controversial issues, which may compromise the
judiciary's ability to adjudicate those controversies in an impartial manner
should those issues come before the court. 6
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that no "[s]tate [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law."' 7 Preservation of constitutional due process rights
entails maintaining both the actual impartiality of the judiciary as well as
the appearance of impartiality, 8 both of which are directly affected by
comments made by candidates in judicial elections. 9 As such, eliminating
canons of judicial conduct that promote judicial impartiality has the poten-
tial to universally undermine public confidence in the judiciary. 10
This Note examines the impact of deregulated speech by judicial can-
didates on the public's confidence in the judiciary and provides solutions to
maintain judicial impartiality. Part I of this Note discusses the historical
role played by judicial canons of conduct in preserving due process rights,
the dangers associated with their repeal, and their inability to effectively
stand alone as the sole regulatory mechanism. Part II discusses the impor-
tance of judicial disqualification and recusal in preserving due process
rights and the weaknesses associated with the current standards and admin-
istrative procedures. Finally, Part III presents solutions intended to preserve
the public's confidence in the judiciary by filling the regulatory void cre-
ated by the Court's decision in White.
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 6, (2007), available at
http://www.keepmnjusticeimpartial.org/FinalReportAndRecommendation.pdf (average cost of winning
a judicial election increased 45% from 2002 to 2004, and nine states had candidates for supreme court
justice seats who raised more than one million dollars in the 2006 election cycle); JAMES SAMPLE,
LAUREN JONES, & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 2 (2006),
available at http://www.faircourts.org/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf (2006 candidates
for the supreme court ran television commercials in ten of eleven states with supreme court races, up
from four of eighteen states in which candidates ran television commercials in 2000).
6. White, 536 U.S. at 810 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("What remains within the Announce Clause
is the category of statements that essentially commit the candidate to a position on a specific issue, such
as 'I think all drunk drivers should receive the maximum sentence permitted by law.' ... (candidate
may not say 'I'm going to decide this particular issue this way in the future.')").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Unites States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 425-26 (8th Cir. 1984).
9. See White, 536 U.S. at 775; see also JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, FAIR
COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 9 (2008), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/l afcO474a5a53df4dO_7tm6brjhd.pdf.
10. SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 9.
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I. JUDICIAL CANONS OF CONDUCT AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS -
PRESERVING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
States enforce canons of judicial conduct to uphold litigants' rights to
an impartial trial and to preserve the public's confidence in the courts' fair-
ness. 11 Therefore the canons uphold the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process guarantees by establishing a baseline of judicial conduct to head off
questions regarding the impartiality and open-mindedness of the judici-
ary. 12
The Court's ruling in White that Minnesota's Announce Clause canon
was an unconstitutional limitation on a protected form of speech was the
first time the Court had ever ruled on a judicial ethics provision, and has
prompted questions into the constitutionality of other similarly-designed
canons.13 The dispute in White stems from a complaint filed against a can-
didate for associate judge to the Minnesota Supreme Court . 4 The com-
plaint claims that campaign literature distributed by the candidate violated
Minnesota's Announce Clause by criticizing previous decisions by the
Minnesota Supreme Court and announcing the candidate's own views on
those issues decided by the Court. i5 In response to the complaint, the can-
didate sought an advisory opinion from the Minnesota Lawyers Profes-
sional Responsibility Board and ultimately filed a lawsuit in Federal Court
challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's Announce Clause. 16 The
United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with the candidate and held
Minnesota's Announce Clause unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment rights of candidates for judicial office.'
7
Subsequent to White, where the Court attempted to distinguish the
First Amendment rights applicable to judicial elections from those applica-
ble to legislative and executive elections, 18 some commentators have
11. See Raab v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290-91 (N.Y. 2003)
("[L]itigants have a right guaranteed under the Due Process Clause to a fair and impartial magistrate
and the State, as the steward of the judicial system, has the obligation to create such a forum .. "); see
also GASS, supra note 3, at 5-6.
12. See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d I, 7 (N.Y. 2003) ( "[O]penmindedness is central to the judicial
function for it ensures that each litigant appearing in the court has a genuine-as opposed to illusory-
opportunity to be heard."); see also GASS, supra note 3, at 5.
13. See GASS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
14. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768-69 (2002).
15. See id. ("[The candidate] distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion.").
16. See id. at 769-70.
17. See id. at 788.
18. See id. at 783 ("[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns
for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.").
2010]
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claimed that any restrictions imposed on judicial campaign speech conflict
with White and are therefore unconstitutional. 19
The canon at issue in White was considered to be a content-based re-
striction on speech, and therefore subject to the strict scrutiny test requiring
the language of the canon to be "(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a com-
pelling state interest. ' 20 At the time White was decided, eight other states
enforced canons similar to Minnesota's Announce Clause, 21 which was
based on language from the 1972 American Bar Association's Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. 22 White held that the Announce Clause failed the strict
scrutiny test because it restricted the candidate's speech while permitting
unfettered speech of judicial candidates-to-be and sitting judges.23 Specifi-
cally, this disparity in treatment between similarly situated groups possess-
ing equivalent capacities to undermine the integrity of the judiciary
prompted the Court to hold that the Announce Clause was insufficient to
protect the compelling state interest of preserving an impartial judiciary.24
While the Court found that Minnesota's Announce Clause was uncon-
stitutional, it specifically did not address similar canons of judicial conduct
providing other types of content-based restrictions on judicial campaign
speech. 25 Chief among the remaining canons unaddressed by White is the
Pledge or Promise Clause,26 which has been thrust into the spotlight by
First Amendment advocates and commentators attempting to expand the
reach of White.27
Subsection A of this Part discusses the valuable role played by the
Pledge or Promise Clause in preserving the public's confidence in the judi-
ciary through enforcement of reasonable limitations on speech. 28 Subsec-
tion B devotes additional discussion to the flurry of challenges mounted
against Pledge or Promise Clauses29 subsequent to the Court's decision in
19. See GASS, supra note 3, at I ("The North Carolina Justices, for example, decided to permit
judicial candidates to promise voters specific results in particularly cases ... to get ahead of a trend in
federal court rulings and to avoid lawsuits over the state requirements, although ... White explicitly
avoided the issue.").
20. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
21. See GASS, supra note 3, at 2.
22. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
23. See id. at 775-781.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 770; see also In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 86 (Fla. 2003).
26. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC-approved.pdf.
27. See GASS, supra note 3, at 2-3; ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1-3, 5, cmt.
(2003).
28. See generally In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2003); Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77.
29. See GASS, supra note 3, at 2.
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White. Finally, Subsection C explores both the importance of safeguarding
the Pledge or Promise Clause as well as its inherent regulatory shortcom-
ings that mandate a broader regulatory approach to preserve the public's
confidence in the judiciary.
A. Pledge or Promise Clause
Since White, the majority of states rely on some variation of the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Pledge or Promise Clause to establish
a baseline for impartial conduct by the judiciary.30 The Pledge or Promise
Clause, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) of the ABA's 1990 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, prohibits judicial candidates from "mak[ing] pledges, promises or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office .... -31 The stated purpose of the Pledge or
Promise Clause is to prohibit judicial candidates from making promises, in
order to avoid "[impairing] the integrity of the court by making the candi-
date appear to have pre-judged an issue without benefit of argument or
counsel, applicable law, and the particular facts presented in each case." 32
Thirty-seven states have adopted the ABA's Pledge or Promise Clause into
their canons of judicial conduct in an effort to maintain an impartial judici-
ary. 3
3
Unlike the Announce Clause, which prohibited candidates for judicial
office from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues,
34
the Pledge or Promise Clause takes a more moderate approach by only
prohibiting candidates from committing themselves to a case, controversy
or issue likely to come before the court. 35 For instance, courts have held
30. See id. at 11.
31. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (1990), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_5 .html.
32. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (recognizing that campaign
promises "pose a special threat to openmindedness"); see also Ackerson v. Ky. Jud. Ret. and Removal
Comm'n, 776 F.Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7 ("[The promises and
pledges clause] furthers the State's interest in preventing actual or apparent party bias and promoting
openrindedness because it prohibits a judicial candidate from making promises that compromise the
candidate's ability to behave impartially, or to be perceived as unbiased and open-minded by the public,
once on the bench. Such promises, even if they are not kept once the candidate is elected, damage the
judicial system because the newly elected judge will have created a perception that will be difficult to
dispel in the public mind. With all the uncertainties inherent in litigation, litigants and the bar are
entitled to be free of the additional burden of wondering whether the judge to whom their case is
assigned will adjudicate it without bias or prejudice and with a mind that is open enough to allow
reasonable consideration of the legal and factual issues presented.").
33. See GASS, supra note 3, at 3.
34. See White, 536 U.S. at 768.




that pledges made by candidates to "stop suspending sentences" and "stop
putting criminals on probation" violate the Pledge or Promise Clause by
promising a specific course of action if elected. 36 Likewise, courts have
held that comments evincing a prejudicial animus made during judicial
campaigns are also prohibited by the Pledge or Promise Clause. 37 Unlike
the Announce Clause, the Pledge or Promise Clause allows judicial candi-
dates to declare their views on issues during the campaign, but requires
candidates to temper their views to avoid making a pledge or promise about
an issue that the court may decide in the future. 38
B. Challenges to the Pledge or Promise Clause
Despite the increased breadth of permissible campaign speech pro-
vided by White, judges and interest groups across the country have seized
the opportunity to mount numerous attacks on the remaining canons, with
their favorite target being the Pledge or Promise Clause. 39 Regardless of
White's explicit avoidance of addressing the constitutionality of the Pledge
or Promise Clause, 40 the impact of White has spurred numerous legal chal-
lenges directed at expanding judicial candidates' scope of permitted speech
by amending or invalidating the remaining canons. 41
The most far reaching and successful attack on the Pledge or Promise
Clause occurred in North Carolina, where the supreme court eliminated the
Pledge or Promise Clause from the state's canons and amended another
canon to allow a judge to engage in "political activity consistent with his
status as a political official. '42 The amendments to North Carolina's canons
36. In re Hann, 676 N.E.2d 740,741 (Ind. 1997).
37. See In re Burdick, 705 N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999) (candidate stating
intent to "be a tough judge that supports the death penalty and isn't afraid to use it" violated promises
and pledges clause).
38. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4, 7 (N.Y. 2003) ("[S]tatements that merely express a viewpoint
do not amount to promises of future conduct... [M]ost statements identifying a point of view will not
implicate the 'pledges or promises' prohibition. The rule precludes only those statements of intention
that single out a party or class of litigants for special treatment, be it favorable or unfavorable, or con-
vey that the candidate will behave in a manner inconsistent with the faithful and impartial performance
ofjudicial duties if elected.").
39. See generally Watson, 794 N.E.2d I; In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003); Smith v. Phillips,
2002 WL 1870038 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
40. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Kinsey, 842 So, 2d at 86-87; Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6; Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d
1312, 1320-21 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
42. GASS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that North Carolina changed the basic canon from "a judge
should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his judicial office" to "a judge may engage in
political activity consistent with his status as a public official"); see also Raban, supra note 4, at 224
("The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently amended Canon 7(B) of North Carolina's Judicial
Conduct so as to allow judges to 'attend, preside over, and speak at any political party gathering."').
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were not prompted by litigation, but rather were accomplished through
canon "reform" led by the supreme court and without the benefit of any
public input.43 The unilateral actions 44 taken by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court have been criticized as a serious threat to a litigant's most
basic right to a fair hearing from an independent and impartial judge.
45
Despite the preemptive actions taken by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, the majority of attacks against the canons originate through litiga-
tion.46 For example, in Smith v. Phillips, a candidate for a judicial post in
Texas challenged a Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon that stated:
a judge or judicial candidate shall not make statements that indicate an
opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the
office which is being sought or held, except that discussion of an indi-
viduals' judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a manner
which does not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on
any particular case.47
The Smith court used the decision in White as justification for declar-
ing the Texas Canon an unconstitutional limitation on protected speech.48
By allowing judicial candidates to sound more like candidates for leg-
islative or executive offices, the deregulatory steps taken by the courts in
North Carolina and Texas have the potential to transform judicial cam-
paigns into "highly politicized contests destined to change the culture of the
judicial office. . . ."49 Other courts, however, acknowledge a clear differ-
ence between candidates for judicial office and those running for other
public offices, 50 thus indicating that certain limitations on speech are ac-
ceptable within the context of judicial campaigns.
An example of a canon imposing acceptable limitations on speech can
be found in Florida, where a candidate for judicial office unsuccessfully
challenged the State's Pledges and Promises Clause, which is substantially
similar to the ABA's Pledge or Promise Clause. 51 In that case, a judicial
43. GASS, supra note 3, at 4.
44. See id. at 4 ("The state Supreme Court did all of this .. without giving the public any notice
or opportunity to comment on the changes; an order simply appeared out of the blue on April 2, 2003,
announcing the new rules.").
45. Id.
46. See generally Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Phillips, 2002 WL
1870038 (W.D. Tex. 2002); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72
(N.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2003).
47. Smith v. Phillips, 2002 WL 1870038 at 1.
48. Id.
49. Raban, supra note 4, at 225.
50. See Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 86
(N.D.N.Y. 2003).
51. See Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 86-87; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 (2007)
(prohibits candidates for judicial office from "mak[ing] pledges, promises or commitments that are
20~1
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
candidate used promises to cultivate the appearance 52 that she "harbored a
prosecutor's bias and police officers could expect more favorable treatment
from her,"'53 which conflicted with Florida's requirement that candidates
provide equal emphasis on their duty to uphold the law if elected.54 Finding
in favor of the State, the court held that the canon in question "serves a
compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of our judiciary and
maintaining the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary. ' 55 Addition-
ally, the court held that the candidate's comments violated the canon by
causing "[c]riminal defendants and criminal defense lawyers... concern
that they will not be facing a fair and impartial tribunal.
56
Another unsuccessful challenge to the Pledge or Promise Clause oc-
curred in New York, where a court upheld the constitutionality of the
canon, stating that it "promotes the State's interest in preventing party bias
and the appearance of party bias, as well as furthering openmindedness and
the appearance of open-mindedness in the state judiciary. ' 57 In that case, a
candidate for city judge made numerous pro-law enforcement promises
58
during his campaign, only to invoke a defense based on White, stating that
the Court's decision "evidence[d] a strong trend toward permitting open
speech in judicial campaigns." 59 In addressing the candidate's argument,
the court noted that "the perception of impartiality [in the judiciary] is as
important as actual impartiality" 60  and that "[c]ampaign prom-
ises ... gravely risk distorting public perception of the judicial role."'61
Despite the content-based speech limitations presented by the Pledge or
Promise Clause, the courts in New York and Florida represent two exam-
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.").
52. Kinsey, 842 So.2d at 87-89. In Kinsey, the candidate for judicial office published a flyer
stating "Your police officers expect judges to take their testimony seriously and to help law enforce-
ment by putting criminals where they belong.., behind bars!" Id at 87-88 (emphasis in original). The
candidate also stated "Pat Kinsey will support our valiant law enforcement officers. .. not make their
jobs harder" and "victims have a right to expect judges to protect them by denying bond to potentially
dangerous offenders." Id at 88. The candidate also declared that it was a judge's responsibility to be
"absolutely a reflection of what the community wants." Id. at 89.
53. See id. at 88.
54. See id. at 87.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 89.
57. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003).
58. See id. at 2 ("[The candidate urged voters to] 'put a real prosecutor on the bench." [The candi-
date] asserted in the correspondence that '[w]e are in desperate need of a Judge who will work with the
police, not against them. We need a judge who will assist our law enforcement officers as they aggres-
sively work towards cleaning up our streets."').
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. at 7.
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pies of courts recognizing the importance of the canons in maintaining the
impartiality of the judiciary.62
C. Limits on the Effectiveness of the Pledges or Promises Clause
While a court has yet to strike down a Pledge or Promise Clause, there
are still limits to its ability to effectively regulate campaign speech.63 The
United States Supreme Court strongly criticized the use of the Pledge or
Promise Clause as the sole means of regulating judicial campaign speech,
primarily because of the relative ease with which a candidate can avoid
using the words "I promise" or, conversely, qualifying each of her positions
with the phrase "although I cannot promise anything." 64 A candidate could
conceivably sidestep this canon by carefully selecting her words to avoid
using the word "promise" while leaving an impression with the electorate
that a judicial candidate has in fact made a promise.65
Historically, courts have interpreted the Pledge or Promise Clause to
extend beyond campaign statements involving the different variants of the
word "promise" 66 to promises that are not explicit.67 In contrast, the
Court's discussion of the Pledge or Promise Clause in White focuses solely
on explicit promises and threatens to supersede historical interpretations of
promises being either implicit or explicit. 68 Limiting the applicability of the
Pledge or Promise Clause to only explicit promises would seriously impair
the ability of such clauses to maintain the integrity of the judiciary by ex-
empting from regulation all statements not including a phrase equal to "I
promise."
The Court's decision in White elevated the Pledge or Promise Clause
to serve as the principal ethical standard distinguishing judicial campaigns
from the politicized contests typical of legislative and executive elections. 69
Despite the inherent shortcomings of the Pledge or Promise Clause, the
mere fact that it is the subject of constant challenge indicates the important
role it serves in preserving judicial integrity by establishing a reasonable
baseline for campaign conduct.70 Eliminating the Promises or Pledges
62. See generally id.; In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
63. See GASS, supra note 3, at 11.
64. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 819 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 4.
67. See generally In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001); Summe v. Judicial Ret. and Re-
moval Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Ky. 1997); Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1; Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77.
68. See Raban, supra note 4, at 226.
69. See GASS, supra note 3, at 13.
70. See generally Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Phillips, 2002 WL
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Clause would permit an augmented scope of campaign speech from which
inferences could easily be drawn that a judge has pre-determined the out-
come of a controversy without the benefit of the facts, thus undermining
public confidence in the judiciary. 71 The Court's decision in White makes
preserving the Pledge or Promise Clause vital to winning the public's con-
fidence that a trial before an impartial judiciary is a right and not a privi-
lege.
II. ALTERNATE PATHS TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION
In addition to canons regulating judicial speech, recusal and disquali-
fication of judges play valuable roles in maintaining an impartial judiciary.
Recusal occurs when a judge voluntarily removes himself from a case
while disqualification refers to involuntary or mandatory removal of a
judge from a case. 72 While recusal and disqualification are technically dif-
ferent terms, they function similarly 73 and are treated as one-in-the-same by
this Note. In contrast to canons regulating judicial speech, which maintain
judicial integrity by regulating judicial campaign speech, recusal and dis-
qualification protect due process rights after a judge has been elected. Also,
recusal and disqualification are generally viewed as more versatile methods
to promote judicial impartiality because neither is subject to the same First
Amendment speech-limitation scrutiny discussed by the Court in White. 74
Forty-seven states have adopted the ABA's recusal and disqualifica-
tion standard, 75 which states that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or her-
self in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned .... ,,76 The ABA's recusal and disqualification standards
provide a national baseline for appropriate judicial behavior intended to
preserve the public's confidence in the judiciary by establishing when it is
inappropriate for a judge to hear a case.77 Despite nearly universal adoption
1870038 (W.D. Tex. 2002); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72
(N.D.N.Y. 2003); Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 87; Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6.
71. See Ackerson v. Ky. Jud. Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
72. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJC.-approved.pdf ("In many jurisdictions, the term
'recusal' is used interchangeably with the term 'disqualification.'); see also SAMPLE, POZEN &
YOUNG, supra note 9, at 5 ("[D]isqualification functions essentially as recusal.").
73. See Sample, Pozen & Young, supra note 9, at 5.
74. Id. at 25.
75. Id. at 17.
76. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A) (2007).
77. Id.; see also SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 18 ("[A] judge should always recuse
herself (or be disqualified) when she is biased against one of the parties, previously served as a lawyer
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of the ABA's recusal and disqualification standard, commentators have
voiced strong criticism about the clarity of the current standard, which in
turn has discouraged enforcement and caused it to be frequently disre-
garded.78
Part II of this Note discusses current recusal and disqualification stan-
dards enforced throughout the country. Additional discussion regarding the
various methods states employ to administer disqualification is included to
highlight the inherent shortcomings of the current methods. Finally, recent
examples of disqualification and recusal are explored to illustrate how the
current standards and administrative procedures work toward undermining
the public's confidence in the judiciary.
A. Current Recusal Standards
The history of the American judicial system is strongly influenced by
the judges' "duty to sit" 79 and the "rule of necessity," both of which pro-
vide that "when no impartial judge is available, the original judge(s) as-
signed to the case may take it.''80 Both the duty to sit and rule of necessity
place a higher priority on conducting a trial than on ensuring the impartial-
ity of the judge conducting the trial. 81 As a result of the duty to sit and the
Rule of Necessity, there is an exceedingly high burden of proof required to
remove a judge from a case and an incoherent framework for administering
disqualification and recusal.82 Despite the courts proclivity for conducting
trials notwithstanding impartiality, nearly all legal systems throughout time
have recognized exceptions 83 to a judges' duty to sit to respect the belief
in the matter in controversy, has an economic interest in the subject matter of greater than de minimis
value, is related to a party or lawyer in the proceeding within the third degree of kinship, has personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or has made improper ex parte communications during the
course of the proceeding.").
78. See id. at 8.
79. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts
Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 512-13 (2007).
80. Id. at 519.
81. See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L.
REv. 543, 545-46 (1994).
82. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 519-20.
83. See id. at 512 ("Under medieval Jewish law, judges were barred from participating in any case
in which a litigant was a friend, kinsman, or someone they disliked. The Roman Code of Justinian went
further, permitting parties to remove judges for mere 'suspicion' of bias. While the civil law ultimately
incorporated the Justianian template into its system of 'recusation,' still operative in many countries
today, the common law took a much more constricted approach: 'a judge was disqualified for direct
pecuniary interest and nothing else.' Early English courts distinguished between a judge's interests and
his biases, prejudices, or affinities, and categorically rejected the latter as grounds for disqualifica-
tion.").
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that "no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause."' 84 With much of
the credit being owed to the American Bar Association, 85 the current trend
in the American legal system is to broaden the scope of exceptions to a
judges' duty to sit to require disqualification and recusal more frequently in
furtherance of an impartial judiciary.
86
Although governed by an expansive variety of authority,8 7 the ac-
cepted standard governing disqualification and recusal is Rule 2.11 (A) of
the ABA's 2007 Model Code, which forty-seven states and the United
States Congress have adopted.88 The ABA's disqualification and recusal
standards state that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned .... -89 Widely hailed as "the demise of the duty-to-sit doctrine," 90
the ABA's disqualification and recusal standard mandates that judges
recuse themselves upon even the appearance of compromised impartial-
ity.91 Also, the ABA standard aims to bring judicial disqualification stan-
dards in line with the due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment by
establishing criteria designed to preserve judicial impartiality both in form
and substance.92 Regardless of the ABA's lofty aims, however, the dis-
qualification process is plagued by administrative inconsistencies that work
against the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Administering Disqualification
While courts handle motions for disqualification in a variety of
ways,93 the majority of states 94 provide challenged judges with the author-
84. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009).
85. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 513-14.
86. See id. at 513-14 (disqualification rules have been "steadily liberalized" by increasing the
number of disqualifying factors, shifting the evidentiary burden from evidence of actual bias to evi-
dence of the appearance of bias, and requiring judges to evaluate claims objectively rather than subjec-
tively).
87. See id. at 516-17 (disqualification law is governed by a variety of instruments including
constitutional provisions, statutes, court rules, judge-made doctrine, codes of judicial conduct, ethics
board rulings, and administrative directives).
88. Id. at 513; SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 17.
89. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A) (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJC-approved.pdf.
90. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 514 (internal quotations omitted).
91. See id. at 513-14 ("While a judge still may have a duty to sit in cases where he or she is not
disqualified, there is an equally strong duty not to sit in cases where he or she is disqualified.").
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002); see also Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note
9, at 9.
93. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 522.
94. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 547, ("Twenty-seven states agree that recusal rests within the
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ity to grant or deny disqualification motions filed against them.95 Generally
speaking, once a motion for disqualification is filed, courts either: 1) re-
quire the challenged judge to transfer the motion to an alternate judge to
evaluate the motion; 2) require the challenged judge to transfer the motion
to an alternate judge after the challenged judge has evaluated the timeliness
and sufficiency of the motion; or 3) allow the challenged judge to decide on
the motion. 9
6
The majority of states follow the third approach, which is based on the
belief that judges are bound by oath to remain impartial and are best suited
to determine whether they are able to fulfill their oath of impartiality.97 A
decision made by the challenged judge regarding the sufficiency of the
motion may only be overturned on appeal if the moving party can show it
was an abuse of discretion. 98
The remaining states that require the challenged judge to transfer the
motion to another judge do so to avoid forcing a litigant to deal with a
judge possessing a "bent of mind."99 Nevertheless, the same weighty abuse
of discretion standard for appeal applies to jurisdictions requiring the chal-
lenged judge to transfer the motion to another judge. 100
The varied approaches for handling motions for disqualification are
partially attributable to the absence of an ABA Model Code standard ad-
dressing how such motions are to be handled.' 0 ' Unlike the ABA standard
identifying when recusal and disqualification are required, 10 2 the ABA
provides no recommendation on a preferred method of adjudicating mo-
tions for disqualification. The lack of clear direction on how best to admin-
ister disqualification directly inhibits the effectiveness of disqualification as
a tool to safeguard judicial impartiality.
10 3
sound discretion of the challenged judge.").
95. See id. at 545.
96. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 522-23.
97. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 545-46.
98. See id. at 556, (An appeal will be granted if "it is plain that a fair minded person could not
rationally come to [the same] conclusion on the basis of the known facts.").
99. Johnson v. Dist. Ct., 674 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. 1984).
100. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 555-56.
101. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 522.
102. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A) (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJC-approved.pdf.
103. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 544, ("The [ABA Code] fails to address the method for
handling a motion to recuse."); Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 530, ("The fact that
judges ... decide on their own recusal challenges.., is one of the most heavily criticized features of
United States disqualification law-and for good reason.").
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C. Limitations on Effectiveness ofDisqualification & Recusal Standards
Mirroring the near-universal applicability of the American Bar Asso-
ciation's recusal and disqualification standard is the level of difficulty as-
sociated with removing a judge from a case. 104 Historically, recusal and
disqualification are disfavored options based on the need to have a judge
preside over a dispute. 10 5 Impartiality was considered an afterthought dur-
ing an era with fewer judges and less convenient travel. 106 When presented
with the choice of holding a trial with a biased judge or holding no trial at
all, courts displayed a clear proclivity for providing some form of justice,
no matter how imperfect it may be. 107 Therefore, the burden associated
with removing a judge through recusal or disqualification was-and to a
great extent still is-extraordinarily onerous. 10
8
Specifically, a party seeking to remove a judge for cause must show
facts "that would raise significant doubt as to whether justice would be
done in the case." 10 9 This burden is heavy from an evidentiary and political
standpoint, requiring attorneys to expend significant resources delving into
a judge's background in an attempt to prove bias, only to be rewarded with
potential disfavor in the future from the judge the attorney attempted to
remove.1 10 Likewise, while the evidentiary burden is significantly less in
states that permit judges to be removed without showing cause, 111 the same
political disincentive remains for attorneys who make their living persuad-
ing judges to agree with their point-of-view. 112
The fundamental difficulty associated with removing a judge is best il-
lustrated by the circumstances surrounding two recent cases: 1) the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.,113 and 2) the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's deci-
sion in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.114 Both cases involve newly
elected state supreme court justices declining to recuse themselves from
proceedings involving campaign contributors as parties, only to have both
justices cast the deciding vote clearing each contributing party of liabil-
104. See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 18.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 545-46.
108. See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 18
109. See id.
110. See id. at 20.
Ill. See id. at 18 ("one third of states may disqualify a judge without showing cause.").
112. Id. at20.
113. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (II1. 2005).
114. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
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ity. 115 The circumstances surrounding both decisions have rightfully called
into question the judiciary's ability to maintain the public's confidence
while permitting judges to determine their own impartiality.
116
1. Avery v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
Avery involved a class action suit for breach of contract alleging that
an insurance company violated a contractual duty to restore automobiles to
their original pre-crash condition because it used automobile parts that
were salvaged from other vehicles damaged in automobile accidents.
117
The Illinois Circuit Court of Williamson County held in favor of the plain-
tiffs and awarded over one billion dollars in damages. 18 After the appellate
court affirmed the circuit court's holding, the defendant insurance company
appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed the
lower courts' holdings with a split decision in favor of the insurance com-
pany.119
Avery was decided shortly after the 2004 election cycle, during which
Justice Lloyd Karmeier was elected to the Illinois Supreme Court. 120 Dur-
ing the campaign, which occurred after the United Stated Supreme Court
relaxed campaign speech regulations with their decision is Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 121 Justice Karmeier made numerous pro-
business statements 122 and received over $350,000.00 in campaign contri-
butions from the insurance company's employees and lawyers. 123 After
being elected to the bench, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse himself
from Avery and personally cast the deciding vote in favor of the insurance
company. 124 Counsel for the plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court questioning whether the "extreme circum-
115. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510; Brief for the Brennan Center of Justice
at NYU School of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/7ef37b5cbb848b77e8_.b9m6b5zt9.pdf.
116. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510-11; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note
115, at 3-4.
117. See Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 811.
118. Id. at810.
119. Id. at 881.
120. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510.
121. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 771 (2002).
122. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510, (Justice Karmeier made comments
alluding to "fix[ing] the medical malpractice of phony lawsuits against doctors and hospital.").
123. Brief for 12 Organizations Concerned About the Influence of Money on Judicial Integrity,
Impartiality, and Independence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 125 S. Ct. 1470 (2006) (No. 05-842).
124. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510.
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stances" surrounding Justice Karmeier's refusal to recuse himself consti-
tuted a violation of due process rights guaranteed under the United States
Constitution, but the Court denied the writ. 1
25
Illinois has adopted the ABA recusal standard requiring a judge to
"disqualify himself.. . in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.' 126 Despite Justice Karmeier's pro-
business philosophy discussed during the campaign and financial contribu-
tions provided by groups that would benefit if the defendant insurance
company were cleared of any liability, 127 Justice Karmeier unilaterally
determined that his impartiality in Avery was not at issue and that the
ABA's recusal standard did not apply. Given the comments made by Jus-
tice Karmeier during the campaign and his list of financial donors, the mere
appearance of a causal relationship raises reasonable concerns regarding
Justice Karmeier's ability to administer justice and causes the public's con-
fidence in the judiciary to suffer. 128 Moreover, Justice Karmeier's ability to
determine his own capacity for impartiality makes a mockery of the state's
disqualification process. 1 29
2. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company
A similar set of circumstances appeared in Caperton, where the chief
executive officer of an energy company spent three million dollars in sup-
port of Justice Brent Benjamin's campaign for a seat on the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 130 During Justice Benjamin's campaign, the
energy company was preparing an appeal to overturn a fifty million dollar
verdict against the energy company. 131 Similar to the situation in Avery,
Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself from the proceedings involving
the energy company and ultimately cast the deciding vote to overturn the
fifty million dollar verdict rendered by the lower court.
132
Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself from Caperton despite the
125. Brief for 12 Organizations, supra note 123.
126. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJC-approved.pdf.
127. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510 ("[Justice] Karmeier more than $2
million from the Chamber of Commerce... in direct contributions."); see also DEBORAH GOLDBERG,
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 18 (2005), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/dd00e9b682e3ca2fl7_xdm6io68k.pdf (Together both candidates raised $9.3
million in political contributions, a national record for judicial elections.).
128. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 510-11.
129. See id. at 532, ("The Avery case illustrates a problem with recusal procedures....").
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United States Supreme Court's consistent holding that "[t]rial before an
unbiased judge is essential to due process." 133 His decision not to recuse
himself was undoubtedly aided by the courts' prior inconsistent interpreta-
tions regarding what constitutes "bias." 134 Since 1989, at least five state
supreme courts have held that the Due Process Clause requires recusal only
in instances involving "actual bias," and that the "appearance of impropri-
ety" is insufficient to mandate recusal. 135 To muddy the waters further,
other state courts emphasize the due process dangers associated with the
appearance of impropriety and require judges to recuse themselves from
cases involving parties who have contributed to the judge's reelection ef-
forts. 136
The lack of consistency regarding when recusal is necessary provides
judges the flexibility to rule on cases involving parties affiliated with the
judge, thus undermining the public's confidence in their ability to receive a
fair trial. 137 This is best illustrated by Justice Benjamin's determination that
the defendant's campaign contribution of three million dollars 138 was insuf-
ficient to establish "actual bias," therefore relieving Justice Benjamin of the
duty to recuse himself.139
The divergence in opinions regarding when a judge must recuse him-
self and the high potential for perpetuating the situations presented in Avery
and Caperton influenced the United States Supreme Court's decision to
grant certiorari for Caperton in November of 2008.140 The Court's decision
to hear Caperton came at the urging of numerous groups voicing concerns
about Caperton's impact on due process rights and the public's confidence
in the judiciary. 1
41
133. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (internal quotation omitted); see also
Aiken County v. BSP Div. of Envirotech Corp., 866 F.2d 661, 678 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause protects not only against express judicial improprieties but also against conduct that
threatens the 'appearance of justice."').
134. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at 24-26.
135. See, e.g., State v. Canales, 916 A.2d 767, 781 (Conn. 2007); Cowan v. Board of Comm'rs of
Freemont County, 148 P.3d 1247, 1260 (Idaho 2006); Allen v. Rutledge, 139 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark.
2003); Commonwealth v. Brandenburg, 114 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Ky. 2003); State v. Brown, 776 P.2d
1182, 1188 (Haw. 1989).
136. See Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 799 (Okla. 2001); See also MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bar-
gain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1337 n.4 (Fla. 1990).
137. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at 2-3.
138. See id. at 3 (defendant's campaign contributions comprised "more than all other contributions
in support of that judge combined").
139. See id. at 27.
140. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co, Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W.Va. 2008), cert.
granted 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/08-00022qp.pdf.
141. See, e.g., Brief for the Am. Acad. of Appellate Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), available at http://ww-w.brennancenter.org/page/-
/Democracy/08caperton/090105.caperton.Acad.App.Lawyers.pdf; Brief for the Am. Bar Ass'n as
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In a much anticipated opinion issued in June of 2009, the Court held
that Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from the proceedings vio-
lated the plaintiff's due process rights. 142 Specifically, the Court stated
there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable
perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on
the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign
when the case was pending or imminent.1
43
In so holding, the Court provided a three pronged test focusing on "the
contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money
contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.", 
44
While the Court painstakingly emphasizes the narrow applicability of Ca-
perton to only "extreme facts,"'' 45 it also dedicates significant discussion to
the invaluable role played by each states' judicial cannons of conduct.
146
Regardless of Caperton's seemingly narrow application, the Court has
clearly demonstrated that it will intervene to protect due process rights in
instances where "the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional
level."
147
Notwithstanding the Court's intervention in Caperton, there are many
unsettled issues that will give rise to future recusal conflicts. Chief Justice
Roberts was joined in dissent by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,"48 thus
calling into question the longevity of Caperton based on the Court's narrow
majority. Furthermore, from a purely administrative standpoint, the dissent
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/3fdc25645e49e48980_ezm6bnb5s.pdf; Brief for the Comm. for Econ. Dev. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/2c21a25a06lc25740fidkrn6bnptq.; Brief for Twenty-Seven Former Chief
Justices and Justices Supporting Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a3a1b436ec15afl 368_20m6bxOek.pdf.
142. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
143. Id. at 2263--64.
144. Id. at 2264.
145. See id at 2265. The following facts were considered "extreme": Massey's three-million-dollar
contribution to Justice Benjamin's campaign exceeded the aggregate of all other contributions to Ben-
jamin and was 300% greater than the total amount spent by Benjamin's own campaign committee. Id. at
2264-65.
146. See id. at 2266 ("[T]he codes are the principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses that
threaten to imperil public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected judges.")
(internal quotations omitted).
147. Id. at2265.
148. Id. at 2267.
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identifies forty "uncertainties" arising from the majority's holding. 149 Rely-
ing on a split Court's decision as justification to postpone much-needed
state-led efforts to clarify both when recusal is necessary150 and how it is
administered' 5' would be a mistake. The importance of recusal reform is
even more pressing in light of ongoing attacks against the canons and the
ability of recusal standards to mandate judicial integrity without being sub-
ject to the type of First Amendment scrutiny seen in White.152 Conversely,
the consequences of maintaining the status quo by allowing judges to





Despite the Court's decision in Caperton to begin to circumscribe ju-
dicial conduct that compromises due process rights and, in turn, the pub-
lic's confidence in the judiciary, the lion's share of the work will fall to the
states. 155 Each state is responsible for ensuring that its canons of judicial
conduct not only provide reasonable parameters for campaign speech, but
also that judges' comments made on the campaign trail are considered
when evaluating disqualification. Additionally, each state is responsible for
administering the recusal and disqualification processes in a transparent
manner that does not allow judges to pass judgment on their own ability to
adjudicate matters in an unbiased fashion.
This section offers potential modifications states may make to their
canons of judicial conduct, disqualification standards, and administration of
the disqualification process to avoid future crises of confidence in the judi-
ciary spurred by the increased politicization of judicial campaigns. Because
of the many issues brought to light by the Court's decision in White, a wide
variety of solutions have already been proposed by different commentators,
all of which are concerned with preserving the public's confidence in the
judiciary. 156 The solutions offered in this Part are intended to construc-
149. Id. at 2269-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
150. See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 8.
151. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 522-23.
152. See SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 25.
153. See generally Avery v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (I1. 2005).
154. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
155. The solutions offered in this Note are by no means exhaustive, but are intended to substan-
tively contribute to the discourse surrounding the many viable solutions previously proposed by others.
156. See CITIZENS COMM'N FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 10, (2007), available at
http://www.keepmnjusticeimpartial.org/FinalReportAndRecommendation.pdf, see generally GASS,
supra note 3; Abramson, supra note 81; Raban, supra note 4; Jason J. Czarnezki, A Call for Change:
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tively add to the abundance of existing solutions.
A. Preserving the Viability of the Canons
As discussed in Part I, canons of judicial conduct play a vital role in
maintaining confidence in the judiciary by establishing reasonable parame-
ters governing campaign speech. 157 In the post-White world, the canon
primarily responsible for maintaining a semblance of separation between
traditional legislative campaigns and judicial campaigns is the Pledge or
Promise Clause. 158 While the Pledge or Promise Clause safeguards judicial
integrity by prohibiting judicial candidates from pledging to rule a certain
way, it also suffers from inherent weaknesses exploited by knowledgeable
candidates who avoid making explicit promises. 159
The Court's opinion in White unmasked its proclivity to narrowly con-
strue the Pledge or Promise Clause by limiting its applicability to explicit
promises made by judicial candidates on the campaign trail. 160 Although a
number of lower courts have made decisions subsequent to White in which
the Pledge or Promise Clause was applied to situations involving implicit
promises, 16 1 the potential danger for the Court to clarify and formalize its
narrow view is real. If the Court determined that application of the Pledge
or Promise Clause to non-explicit promises represented an unconstitutional
limitation on content-based speech, the effectiveness of the Pledge or
Promise Clause in preserving the integrity of the judiciary would be nulli-
fied. 162 In doing so, the Court would leave the vast majority of judicial
campaign speech unregulated and defeat the stated purpose of the Pledge or
Promise Clause by permitting candidates to make promises and pledges to
the electorate as long as the words "I promise" aren't used.
163
The most apparent solution to avoid a future ruling on the applicability
Improving Judicial Selection Methods (Marquette University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-759947; W. Bradley
Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial Elections (Washington & Lee
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 02-4, 2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=306139.
157. See discussion supra Part I.
158. See GASS, supra note 3, at 11.
159. See id.
160. See Raban, supra note 4, at 226.
161. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 88 (Fla. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y.
2003).
162. See Raban, supra note 4, at 226; Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 521.
163. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(13) (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJCapproved.pdf (the promises and pledges clause
prohibits candidates from committing themselves to a case, controversy or issue likely to come before
the court.).
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of the Pledge or Promise Clause is to amend the canon to state that it ap-
plies equally to explicit and non-explicit promises. 164 Amending the canon
in this manner, however, may actually cause more harm than good by pro-
viding its opponents an opportunity to argue that a shift has occurred in the
established pattern of interpreting the Pledge or Promise Clause. 165 Both
pre- and post-White opinions consistently hold that Pledge or Promise
Clauses apply to non-explicit promises made during judicial campaigns. 166
Amending the canon to re-state the status quo runs the unnecessary risk of
putting too much stock in dictum provided by the Court in White, while it
was discussing a fundamentally different limitation on speech presented by
the Announce Clause. 167 Instead, the more prudent path is to leave the
Pledge or Promise Clause unchanged and focus reform efforts on areas
outside the reach of First Amendment advocates through reformation of the
disqualification and recusal standards and processes.
B. Reforming Disqualification & Recusal Standards
The most broadly accepted recusal and disqualification standard, Rule
2.11(A) of the ABA's 2007 Model Code (ABA Code), requires a judge to
remove himself from proceedings "in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."1 68 As illustrated by both the Avery and Caper-
ton cases, determining under which circumstances impartiality may be
called into question is not a bright line analysis. 169 The varied interpreta-
tions of "bias" proffered by state supreme courts, largely prompted by the
United States Supreme Court's absence from the discussion before Caper-
ton, creates an atmosphere in which judges treat the ABA Code as a porous
and malleable recommendation as opposed to a clear, objective rule. 170
Even the guidance provided by the Court in Caperton is tempered by the
Court's determination to have each state set its own recusal guidelines that
164. See Kinsey, 842 So.2d at 87-88 (holding that a judicial candidate's comments indicating
support for law enforcement without explicitly stating the words "I promise" violated the Promises and
Pledges Clause); Raban, supra note 4, at 226.
165. See generally Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77 (holding that an implicit promise violated the Promises
and Pledges Clause); In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001) (same); Summe v. Jud. Ret. and
Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1997) (same); Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (same).
166. See generally Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77; In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001); In re Hann,
676 N.E. 2d 740 (Ind. 1997); Summe v. Jud. Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Ky.
1997); Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1; In re Burdick, 705 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999).
167. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,770 (2002).
168. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007).
169. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at 24-27; Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note
79 at 5 10-11.
170. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at 26-29.
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are more stringent than those mandated by the Due Process Clause. 171 In
other words, it appears that the Court would prefer to stay out of the discus-
sion altogether. 1
72
The greatest divergence between the states relates to whether "actual
bias" is required to remove a judge from a case or if the appearance of bias
is sufficient. 173 The subsections and comments accompanying Rule 2.11 (A)
of the ABA Code provide examples of when a judge's impartiality may be
reasonably called into question, 174 but neglect to directly address the
threshold issue of the nature of bias necessary to remove a judge from a
case. To provide the judiciary with additional clarity regarding what type of
bias will reasonably cause a judge's impartiality to be questioned, the ABA
Code should be amended to require that a judge remove himself from pro-
ceedings "in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned
[due to the existence or appearance of bias] .... ,"175
By including a specific reference to actual or apparent bias, the ABA
Code will fall into lockstep with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee that trials shall be conducted free of actual or apparent bias. 1
76
Likewise, such an amendment to the ABA Code and subsequent state adop-
tion would establish a nationwide baseline for acceptable judicial participa-
tion, thus reducing the potential for judges to make convenient
interpretations based on the varied opinions defining the legal landscape to
date.
In addition to amending the ABA Code to clarify the type of bias suf-
ficient to remove a judge, the Court's decision in Caperton provides valu-
able context based on a present-day situation. A subsection of Rule 2.11 (A)
of the ABA Code states that a removal of a judge is proper based on cam-
paign contributions made to the judge by a party to the lawsuit. 177 While
171. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
172. See id. ("The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifica-
tions. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification than those we find mandated here today... Because the codes of judicial conduct
provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved
without resort to the Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will
thus be confined to rare instances.").
173. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at 29.
174. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 I(A) (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA.MCJC approved.pdf (examples of when a judge's
impartiality may be questioned include when a judge has personal bias concerning a party or party's
attorney, when a judge has an economic interest in the subject matter or a party to the proceeding, when
a judge has made a public statement committing or appearing to commit the judge to ruling a certain
way).
175. Id.
176. See Hollister, 746 F.2d at 425-26.
177. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (A) (2007), available at
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Caperton stops short of identifying a bright-line dollar threshold, the Court
provides guidance by establishing a three-step analysis based on 1) the size
of contribution in comparison to the total amount of contributions received,
2) the total amount of money spent during the campaign, and 3) the appar-
ent effect of the contribution on the outcome of the election.'78 Caperton's
contribution of an analytical framework is an important step toward deter-
mining the elusive answer to "how much is too much?"
Amending the ABA Code to eliminate ambiguity regarding the type of
bias necessary to remove a judge and using Caperton's analytical frame-
work represent two significant strides toward promoting increased judicial
integrity. Both of these steps have the ability to increase the public's confi-
dence in the judiciary by providing clearly defined parameters in an arena
previously characterized by ambiguity. These steps will be insufficient,
however, absent additional substantive modification to the way in which
the recusal and disqualification process is presently administered.
C. Overhauling Disqualification & Recusal Administration
Currently, states handle motions to disqualify a judge in one of three
ways: 1) require the challenged judge to transfer the motion to an alternate
judge to evaluate the motion; 2) require the challenged judge to transfer the
motion to an alternate judge after the challenged judge has evaluated the
timeliness and sufficiency of the motion; or 3) allow the challenged judge
to decide on the motion. 179 The latter two methods, both of which involve
the challenged judge evaluating the sufficiency of at least a portion of the
motion to disqualify, raise substantive concerns regarding the transparency
of the decision-making process and the ability of a judge to determine his
own impartiality status. 180 The fact that the majority of states allow judges
to decide their own disqualification motions 181 makes administering the
removal of a judge nearly impossible, absent a strong showing of abuse of
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA-MCJC.-approved.pdf ("A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questions, including but
not limited to [when] the judge knows or learns. .. that a party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a
party's lawyer has within the previous [insert number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the
judge's campaign in an amount that is greater than [$[insert amount] for an individual or $[insert
amount] for an entity].").
178. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009).
179. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 522-23.
180. See id. at 530 ("Allowing judges to decide on their own recusal motions is in tension not only
with the guarantee of a neutral decision-maker, but also with our explicit commitment to objectivity in
this arena.").





To preserve the public's confidence in the judiciary in the face of in-
creased politicization of judicial campaigns, consideration of motions for
disqualification must not be decided by those against whom they are filed.
Maintaining the appearance of impartiality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee cannot be accomplished when judges
are permitted to pass judgment on their own impartiality. 1
83
The primary counterpoint raised by opponents of transferring disquali-
fication motions to an alternate judge is based on a decreased judicial effi-
ciency associated with having another judge evaluate the motion. 184 While
judicial efficiency is a valid concern, the time and cost associated with
adjudicating these motions can be reduced by relying on oral testimony and
affidavits instead of traditional trial proceedings. 185 Moreover, concerns
regarding the speed in which the judiciary dispenses with its weighty tasks
will be viewed as relatively inconsequential should the public lose confi-
dence in the brand of justice being served. 186 Instead, as commentators
have correctly urged, all motions for disqualification should be immedi-
ately transferred to an alternate judge for a thorough, transparent, and im-
partial evaluation. 187
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in White to hold Minnesota's Announce Clause
unconstitutional sounded the first shot in an ongoing battle; the outcome of
which carries very real implications regarding one's ability to receive a fair
trial. White's invalidation of Minnesota's longstanding canon of judicial
conduct increases the importance of preserving the broad regulatory author-
ity of the remaining canons of judicial conduct, which are relied upon now
more than ever to preserve the impartiality of the judiciary.
Dutifully enforcing the high-minded but flawed canons of judicial
conduct, however, is insufficient to foster the level of judicial integrity
contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Instead, the states must strengthen their recusal and disqualification
182. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 519-520; see also Abramson, supra note 81,
at 556 (abuse of discretion occurs where "it is plain that a fair minded person could not rationally come
to [the same] conclusion on the basis of the known facts.") (intemal citation omitted).
183. Seeid. at561.
184. See Goldberg, Sample & Pozen, supra note 79, at 531.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Abramson, supra note 81, at 561.
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standards to eliminate the ambiguity that has produced inconsistent deter-
minations by state courts regarding when recusal is necessary and contrib-
uted to the situations discussed in Avery and Caperton. The need for the
states to lead this effort is now more apparent than ever, especially consid-
ering the deference provided to the states in Caperton.188
Finally, the current manner of administering recusal and disqualifica-
tion flies in the face of the accepted adage that "no man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause."'1 89 Credibility in the judiciary cannot be realized if
judges are permitted to evaluate their own impartiality. The administrative
procedures associated with recusal and disqualification must be overhauled
to require that a judge other than the one being challenged evaluate and
determine all motions regarding judicial impartiality or bias. These modest
steps represent additions to the already healthy discourse directed at pre-
serving the public's confidence in the judiciary in the wake of White's poli-
ticization of the judiciary.
188. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
189. See id. at 2259.
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